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What follows are concrete comments to [3] concerning the main goal of [2], the
study in Fuzzy Set Theory of the law:
:P1 ^ :P2  P2 _ :P1 ^ :P2: 
(i) Provided the system in [1] contains P0 such that tP0  0 (if not, what?),
(*) yields MaxtP ; 1ÿ tP   1 for any assertion P. Hence, from the very
beginning the system can only contain assertions whose truth values are in
f0; 1g and obviously, either tP1  tP2 or tP1  1ÿ tP2 for any P1; P2.
With ‘‘numerical’’ truth values Elkan’s theoretical argument is a triviality that
says nothing on Fuzzy Logic. But posed with fuzzy sets, as it was done in Ref.
[11] in [2], the question is not so trivial and deserves to be reconsidered.
The system in [1], although called there ‘‘formal system’’, is one whose
‘‘form’’ (structure, initial laws) is actually hidden. Hence, it is unknown how to
make inferences within it, and easy to impose much simpler laws than (*) to
obtain only the numerical truth values 0 and 1.
(ii) In [3], Prof. Elkan asserts that his theorem is not about fuzzy sets but on
something simpler and of great importance: fuzzy truth values attached to
individual logical assertions. In [1,3] he also asserts that his theorem applies to
fuzzy set theory, and that provided Ax;Bx; . . . refer to truth values of
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individual assertions, our Theorem 1 is correct. Since ‘‘fuzzy truth values’’
means ‘‘numerical truth values’’ and ‘‘individual’’ before ‘‘logical assertions’’
means nothing, what is the meaning of Elkan’s claims?
There is a dierence between the interpretation of tA and Ax that Elkan
did not point out. The system in [1] just supposes that ‘‘A logically equivalent
to B’’ implies tA  tB, but in any theory of fuzzy sets what is supposed is
‘‘A  B’’ if and only if Ax  Bx for all x. Consequently, provided P1; P2 are
interpreted as fuzzy sets in (0; 1X , Min, Max, 1ÿ id), (*) is equivalent to our
inequality. Only the hypothesis that (*) does hold simultaneously for any pair
P1; P2 in fA;B; A0;B; A;B0; A0;B0; B;A; B0;A; B;A0; B0;A0g trans-
forms our inequalities for the symmetrical case B \ B06A and A \ A06B into
the equality B \ B0  A.
(iii) Elkan is right when in [3] he claims that the assertions in [2], ‘‘But in
Elkan context, both statements ‘‘A! B is the same as B! A’’, etc’’, are not in
[1]. Nevertheless, it is rather obvious that these quotation marks do not refer to
Elkan’s but to our words as given in paragraph 2.2 in [2] where, when quoting
Elkan, we not only use quotation marks but also the expression ‘‘to the letter’’.
An implicative interpretation of (*) is not reached for all the implications
used in Fuzzy Logic. For example, with Mandani’s or Larsen’s implications
P1 ! P2 is neither equivalent to P2 _ :P1 ^ :P2 nor to :P1 _ :P2 and many
applications of Fuzzy Logic are made with these implications.
(iv) Section 3 in [2] does not concern generalized versions of fuzzy set theory
having ‘‘nothing to do with’’ (see [3] paper [1]). On the contrary, this section
studies (*) in lattices with an involution and, in particular, Boole and
DeMorgan Algebras. And the theory of fuzzy sets obtained with Min, Max
and 1ÿ id is a DeMorgan Algebra.
In a DeMorgan Algebra (*) is equivalent to P2 ^ :P26 P1. Hence, in
Boolean Algebras (*) is a law since P2 ^ :P2  0. It seems that in most in-
teresting lattices with involution the validity of (*) as a law, depends on the
Excluded-Middle Principle.
(v) Section 4 in [2] does not concern generalized versions of fuzzy set theory,
at least as they are understood since 1980. It concerns standard theories (only
one is a lattice) and it is shown that there the validity of (*) as a law is more
closely related to the duality principles than to the Excluded-Middle Principle.
Actually, generalized theories are those introduced in [4]. They have only
one self-contradiction, verify the Excluded-Middle Principle, and it is not
dicult to see in which of them (*) is a law.
(vi) Certainly, Section 5 in [2] deals with some generalized fuzzy set theories
(obtained by mixing standard ones) that, in our view, are of interest when
dealing with predicates on several universes of discourse whose ‘‘logics’’ are not
coincidental, as often happens in applications. Theorem 3 in this section is
completely proven in Ref. [13] given in [2], currently under publication in [5].
Nevertheless, in Ref. [7] in [2], a good part of that proof is published and it is
158 E. Trillas, C. Alsina / Internat. J. Approx. Reason. 26 (2001) 157–159
enough to see the clear objective of Section 5: there are uncountable many
fuzzy set theories where (*) is a law.
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